Descartes’ Dictum Cogito, Ergo Sum: The Relation of Cogito to Sum

Dr. Pushpa Rani Prasad, a Commissioned acting Principal working at S.P. Mahila College, Dumka, Jharkhand (India) writing in both English and Hindi. She is a pioneer of modern vision and her voice for modern Indian women is miracle and outstanding.

Dr. Pushpa Rani Prasad

Abstract

The attempt to put knowledge on certain foundation is historically associated with the philosophy of Descartes.  The most important question that has recurred most frequently regarding Descartes’ dictum ‘Cogito, ergo sum’ is that whether the proposition ‘I think, therefore I am’ is or is not an inference. According to Descartes, by saying cogito, ergo sum, he does not logically (syllogistically) deduce sum from cogito but rather perceives intuitively, the self-evidence of sum. But, there are several passages in the ‘Discourse and Principles’ that cause problems for the above view of Descartes. Philosophers differ on the exact relation of cogito to sum. Bernard Williams has defended the view that it is a kind of inference, though not syllogistic in form. On the other hand, in a recent paper Jaakko Hintikka has expressed the view that the word cogito serves to express the performatory character of Descartes’ insight. In this article, I have also examined Peter Markie’s view that it is self-evident Intuition/Immediate Inference Interpretation. In this article, I have tried to clear up the relation of cogito to sum.

The Relation of Cogito to Sum

Descartes employed methodic doubt with a view to discovering whether there was any indubitable truth. Though he regarded mathematics as the paradigm of knowledge, he knew that its ‘a priori truths’ are not indubitable because it was possible that a malignant demon should deceive him even with respect to those matters of which he was most certain. But he found that there was one proposition which was capable of escaping the demon’s reach. This was his famous dictum the ‘Cogito, Ergo Sum’ – ‘I think, therefore I am’.

Descartes writes:

“But I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No, if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think and that I am something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind.”¹

At first sight, the cogito certainly seems to be an inference. Descartes’ dictum really express an inference is suggested by the particle ergo. In many respects it seems plausible to think that it does express a logical inference. Its logical form seems quite easy to define. In the sentence ‘I think’, an individual receives an attribute; for a modern logician it is therefore of the form “B(a)”. In the sentence ‘I am’ or ‘I exist’ the same individual is said to exist. Such type of views has been expressed by many philosophers. Gassendi claimed that ‘ambulo, ergo sum’, ‘ I walk, therefore I am’, is as good an inference as cogito, ergo sum.

In his reply to Gassendi, Descartes denies that ambulo, ergo sum is comparable with ‘cogito, ergo sum’. The reasons he gave are not very clear. Descartes’ remark is perhaps that although the inferences ‘ambulo, ergo sum’ and ‘cogito, ergo sum’ are parallel, their premises are essentially different. Ambulo is not an indubitable premise in the way cogito may be claimed to be.

In many passages Descartes seems to deny that by saying cogito, ergo sum he does logically (syllogistically) deduce sum from cogito. According to him, “he rather perceives intuitively (by a single act mental vision) the self-evidence of sum”.

Descartes writes:

“When someone says ‘I think, therefore I am’, he does not deduce his existence from his thinking by means of a syllogism, but, by the mind’s simple act of inspection, sees it something that is self-evident. This is apparent from the fact that, if he deduced it by means of a syllogism, he would first have had to know the major premise, “Everything that thinks is or exists”. But that, on the contrary, has been learned from the individuals awareness of himself – that he cannot be thinking unless he exists. For it is the nature of our mind to form general propositions from knowledge of particulars”.²

Jaakko Hintikka is of the view that the relation of the two parts of the ‘cogito, ergo sum’ cannot be a logical inference in the ordinary sense of the word. According to him, in Descartes’ argument the relation of cogito to sum is not that of premise to a conclusion. He says that, “their relation is rather comparable with that of a process to its product. The indubitability of my own existence results from my thinking of it almost as the sound of music results from playing it or light in the sense of illumination (lux) results from the presence of a source of light (lumen)³. Regarding the function of the word cogito in Descartes’ sentence as well as his motives in employing it, Hintikka says that, “it serves to express the performatory character of Descartes’ insight; it refers to the “performance” (to the act of thinking) through, which the sentence ‘I exist’ may be said to verify itself. For this reason, it has a most important function in Descartes’ sentence. It cannot be replaced by any arbitrary verb. The performance (act) through which the existential self-verifiability is manifested cannot be any arbitrary human activity, contrary to what Gassendi claimed. It cannot be an act of walking or an act of seeing”.⁴

Peter Markie is of the view that the answer to this problem is that:

“Descartes intuits the self-evident proposition that he thinks and simultaneously infers that he exists. His knowledge that he thinks is intuitive in the primary sense of being self-evident and entirely non-inferential; his knowledge that he exists is intuitive in the extended sense of being immediately inferred from the simultaneously intuited premise that he thinks”.⁵

Markie has referred to many statements of Descartes, which support this interpretation. Descartes presents intuition and deduction as his only sources of certainty in the Regulae. According to Descartes, deduction is the inference of something as following necessarily from some other propositions with certainty. Intuition is the faculty by which we gain the initial certainties that make deduction possible. Intuition is distinguished from deduction by the fact that it does not involve a movement of thought through a series of inferences and by its immediate self-evidence.

According to Descartes, when we immediately infer a conclusion from an intuited self-evident premise, we are not aware of any movement of thought through series of premises, so we may describe our knowledge of the conclusion as intuitive. No extended series of intuitions lead us to the conclusion, there is just one mental act in which the self-evident premise is intuited and the immediate conclusion is drawn.

Descartes’ remarks in the Discourse and Principles further support this interpretation. In Discourse Descartes says, “And observing that this truth ‘I am thinking therefore I exist’ was so firm and sure that all the most extravagant suppositions of the skeptics were incapable of shaking it, I decided that I could accept without scruple as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking”.⁶

In the Principles Descartes writes:

“For it is a contradiction to suppose that what thinks does not, at the very time it is thinking, exist. Accordingly, this piece of knowledge – I am thinking; therefore, I exist – is the first and most certain of all to occur to anyone who philosophizes in an orderly way”.⁷

In each passage, Descartes presents his immediate inference from his thought to his existence as a single piece of knowledge, it is the first principle of his philosophy. His point seems to be that in one act of intuition, he grasps the premise and immediately infers the conclusion.

Peter Markie has called this interpretation “The self-evident Intuition/Immediate inference interpretation”. But, Descartes’ arguments in some passages cause problems for the above interpretation. In one of the passages in the Principles, Descartes says that prior to knowing that he thinks and therefore he exists, he must know, not only what thought, existence and certainty are, but also the general proposition that it is impossible for what thinks not to exist. His point seems to be that his inference from his thought to his existence uses the general proposition as a suppressed premise. It is not, ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’, it is ‘I am thinking and whatever is thinking must exist, therefore I exist’.

But in his comment to Mersenne in Second Replies, Descartes explicitly denies that his inference from his thought to existence is a syllogism using the general premise that whatever thinks must exist. He repeats the same point in response to one of Gassendi’s objections.

If we modify our interpretation so that Descartes’ inference uses the general premise that whatever thinks must exist, we shall be in conflict with his replies to Mersenne and Gassendi, but if we do not modify our interpretation in this way, how are we to account for his claim in the Principles, that prior to knowing that we think and therefore exist, we must know whatever thinks must exist.

There are several passages that conflict with the self-evident Intuition/Immediate Inference Interpretation. Peter Markie suggests that the Self-evident Intuition/Immediate Inference interpretation can be modified to account for some, though not all, of the problematic passages. To develop the new interpretation, he has examined two basic concepts of Descartes' epistemology, his concept of certainty and his concept of reasonable belief. Descartes' epistemology contains two degrees of epistemic appraisal. One is the top standard of certainty and the other is a lesser degree of justification, which Descartes describes as highly probable or very reasonable belief. All the beliefs that meet the demands of certainty for him, such as his belief about his thought and existence in the Second Meditation, are also very reasonable, but some of his very reasonable beliefs, such as his sensory evidenced beliefs about the external world in the First Meditation, are not certain for him. Which degree of epistemic appraisal a belief meets is determined by his evidence for the belief. The sensory evidence Descartes has for his external world beliefs in the First Meditation makes those beliefs very reasonable but not certain. The evidence Descartes has for his belief in the existence in the Second Meditation makes that belief both very reasonable and certain. When a belief is self-evident, Descartes' evidence for it consists of his act of clearly and distinctly perceiving it. When a belief is not self-evident, Descartes' evidence for it consists of those belief that constitute his reason for believing it. The difference between what is merely very reasonable and what is certain is that Descartes has slight reason to doubt the former. A hypothesis gives Descartes a reason to doubt one of his beliefs just when it is a possibility he has not ruled out and it indicates how his belief might be false despite his evidence. The hypothesis that he is dreaming and that some God deceives him are possibilities he has· not ruled out in the First Meditation and they indicate how his very reasonable beliefs about the external world might be false despite his sensory evidence for them.

In Peter Markie’s view, relative to these points we can better understand Descartes' claim to certainty about his thought and existence. Descartes' claim has two parts:

(i)      He has evidence for these beliefs that makes them very reasonable.

(ii)    That evidence resists even the slightest, most exaggerated reasons for doubt, so that his beliefs are certainties.

In the light of above points, the Self-Evident Intuition/Immediate Inference Interpretation may be modified. The first thing Descartes must do is explain what makes his beliefs in his thought and existence very reasonable. This is where his frequent appeals to clear and distinct perception and an immediate inference from his thought to existence come into play. Descartes takes his belief in his thought to be very reasonable because the proposition that he thinks is a self-evident one he clearly and distinctly perceives to be true. His act of clear and distinct perception is the "evidence" that makes his belief that he thinks very reasonable. The same may be said of his other beliefs about his mental state. His belief in the existence is very reasonable, because he immediately infers it from a very reasonable belief about his mental state.

Yet, what makes these beliefs so reasonable as to be certain? Descartes' answer is that he has no reason to doubt them. Now his observation about how reasons for doubt just affirm his thought and existence comes into play. In Second Meditation Descartes says the Deceptive God Hypothesis and Dream Hypothesis do not give him a reason to doubt his beliefs that he thinks and exists; for they entails them and so fails to indicate how they might be false despite his clear and distinct perception.

If we modify our interpretation in the above way Descartes’ claim appears to be consistent.

Now we will see how the above modified interpretation deals with the passages that cause problems for the initial one. Our modified interpretation easily avoids one of the problems we have examined. Our initial interpretation is inconsistent with Descartes' claim, in the Meditations and Replies, that some clear and distinct perceptions, specifically ones of very simple mathematical truths, are made doubtful by the Deceptive God Hypothesis. Our modified interpretation is consistent with Descartes' claim. It says all clear and distinct perceptions are very reasonable and only those that concern our thought and existence are certain. The difference between the certain clear and distinct perceptions and the merely very reasonable ones is that the former resist reasons for doubt like Deceptive God Hypotheses. Such reasons for doubt do not indicate how our beliefs in our thought and existence might be false despite the clear and distinct perceptions that support them.

Another problem concerns whether Descartes' inference from his thought to his existence is immediate or a syllogism. We have seen a passage in the Principles insists on the importance of a prior knowledge of the general principle that whatever thinks must exist. The way to account for this passage is to pay close attention to what Descartes says he must know prior to knowing his thought and existence. He must know that what thinks must exist, and he must also know what knowledge, thought, existence and certainty are. His point surely is not that all this information must be added to his inference from thought to existence to bridge the gap between his initial premise and his conclusion. He does not need to add definitions of thought, existence and certainty to his argument to get from "I think" to "I exist." His point is this: he must have some of this information to understand the propositions that he thinks and that he exists and the rest to understand his account of why they are certain for him. He cannot understand the propositions, unless he knows what thought and existence are. He cannot understand his account of why they are certain for him unless he knows what certainty is. He cannot understand his account of why they are certain unless he knows that what thinks must exist; for part of his account is that his belief that he thinks immediately entails, and so makes reasonable, his belief that he exists. Descartes does not offer the general principle that what thinks must exist as a suppressed premise in his inference from his thought to his existence. He offers it as something he must know to understand why his thought and existence are certain for him. Moreover, it is sufficient that this general principle is reasonable for Descartes; it need not be certain. When Descartes claims to be certain of his thought and existence in the Second Meditation, he does not offer that claim to certainty - I am certain about my thoughts and existence as a certainty. He presents it and his explanation of why it is true as reasonable beliefs about his epistemic state.

Thus, we see that Peter Markie’s modified version of the self-evident Intuition/Immediate Inference Interpretation avoids the textual problems with the initial version. The above arguments clearly show that the proposition Cogito, Ergo Sum is not an inference.

Conclusion

 The above discussions conclude my survey of the relation of Cogito to sum. We have seen that there is no settled agreement among the philosophers on the exact relationship of Cogito to sum. Bernard Williams in his paper ‘The Certainity of the Cogito’ contends that the relation of cogito to the sum is a kind of inference. Hintikka has raised a number of valid points in his analysis of Descartes’ cogito as a performatory utterance. In this article I have examined Peter Markies’s view that it is self-evident Intuition/Immediate Inference interpretation. This interpretation can be modified in the light of two basic concepts of Descartes’ epistemology, his concept of certainty and his concept of reasonable belief in such a way that avoids the problematic passages. His modified interpretation is consistent with Descartes’ claim that all clear and distinct perception are very reasonable and only those that concern our thought and existence are certain. I support the above view. The arguments given by Markie are very convincing. In my opinion the relation of Cogito to the sum is not an inference but a self-evident intuition/Immediate Interference Interpretation.

Descartes’ claim to certainty about his thought and existence is central to his general program in epistemology. He wants to answer skepticism, and he wants to do so within foundationalism, the view that all our knowledge begins with some self-evident beliefs which are not evidenced by any others but yet provide our justification for all the rest we know. His claim to certainty about his thought and existence is the initial move in his attempt to define the set of self-evident beliefs. Descartes also thinks that his claim to certainty of his thought and existence plays an important role in his metaphysics. He says that the real value of his dictum ‘I think, therefore I am’ is that it can be used to establish that this ‘I which is thinking is an immaterial substance with no bodily element’. This is a continuing theme in Descartes’ philosophy.

But we find that there are some underlying philosophical issues that Descartes leaves. Philosophers have objected to his account of how he gains the very reasonable belief that he thinks to begin with. He says he clearly and distinctly perceives that he thinks. His concept of clear and distinct perception is the least clear and distinct concept in philosophy. He never adequately explains what this mental vision is or why apprehending a proposition by it is sufficient to make belief in the proposition very reasonable. Descartes leaves us wondering exactly how our beliefs about our mental state and existence become reasonable. Descartes is open to a criticism nicely stated by A.J. Ayer.

“What Descartes thought that he had shown was that the statements that he was conscious, and that he existed, were somehow privileged, that, for him at least, they were evidently true in a way which distinguished them from any other statements of fact. But this by no means follows from his argument. His argument does not prove that he, or anyone, knows anything. It simply makes the logical point that one sort of statement follows from another”.⁸

Descartes needs both parts of his explanation of his certainty. He needs an account of what makes his beliefs in his thought and existence very reasonable and an account of why those reasonable beliefs resist every reason for doubt. It may be said in Descartes favour that the issues which he has raised makes his position interesting and important. Thus, we see that the main interpretive issues have been settled, but the philosophical issues remain as part of Descartes’ legacy to us.

Reference:

1.      Cottingham, John and Robert Stoothoff & Dugald Murdoch: The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Cambridge University Press, 1984, Vol.-II, p.p.-16-17.

2.      Descartes, Rene: Replies to the Second set of Objections in the Decartes, A collection of critical essays. Edited by Willis Doney, Anchor Books, Double Day & Company Inc., New York, 1967, p-90.

3.      Hintikka, Jaakko: Cogito, Ergo Sum Inference or Performance; In Descartes: A Collection of Critical Essays, Edited by Willis Doney, Anchor Books, Double Day & Company Inc., New York, 1967, p-122.

4.      Ibid, p-123.

5.      Markie, Peter: The Cogito and Its importance; In The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, Edited by John Cottingham, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.p.-145-146.

6.      Cottingham, John and Robert Stoothoff & Dugald Murdoch: The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Cambridge University Press, 1984, Vol.-I, p.-127.

7.      Ibid, p.-195

8.      Ayer, A.J.: ‘I Think, Therefore I Am’, In Descartes: A Collection of Critical Essays, Edited by Willis Doney, Anchor Books, New York, p-82.

Setu, June 2018

Descartes: As the Creator of Philosophy of Mind – A Critical Estimate of Rene Descartes’ Philosophy of mind-body Relations

Dr. Pushpa Rani Prasad

Abstract

The issue of mind-body relation is as old as the history of Ancient Greek Philosophy. The mind and body share a definite relationship with each other. The problem lies with determining what kind of relationship they share. Evidence indicates that mental events occur as a result of physical neural processes and also, we take it for granted that mental events have physical effects i.e. our perception and desire manage to move our bodily parts. There is no settled agreement on the exact nature of the relationship between mental and physical properties. There are two major schools that have tried to resolve the mind-body problem. These are dualism and monism.

Dualism can be traced back to Plato & Aristotle, but it was most precisely formulated by Rene Descartes. That is why he is often called the creator of philosophy of mind. Descartes claims that mind and body exist as two distinct substances. According to Descartes, minds and bodies causally influence each other. Descartes favors a Divine interpretation of mind-body interaction. Philosophers who advocate monism believe that mind and body are not ontologically distinct kind of entities. Many philosophers have criticized Descartes’ dualism. Ryle has challenged the traditional distinction between mind and body as formulated by Descartes. In his view the facts of consciousness can be linked to the brain. Jaegwon Kim has formulated a ‘real argument’ against the Decartes’ dualism. Kim’s argument shows that immaterial minds cannot causally interact with material things situated in space. I have tried my best to throw light and examine all these aspects in this paper.

Rene Descartes’ Philosophy of Mind-body Relations

The dualist view of persons that Descartes defended is a form of substance dualism. Substance dualism is the thesis that there are substances of two fundamentally distinct kinds in this world, namely minds and bodies-or mental stuff and material stuff- and that a human person is a composite entity consisting of a mind and body, each of which is an entity in its own right. Traditionally, two ideas have been closely associated with the concept of a substance. First, a substance is something in which properties ‘inhere’. Second, a substance is thought to be something that has the capacity for independent existence.

In Descartes’ opinion nature of mind is completely different from that of a body. Mind is a thinking, non-extended thing and body is an extended, non-thinking thing. Since their nature is different, it is possible for one to exist without the other. Descartes has given several arguments in support of his dualistic view. But these arguments are different versions of one and the same argument.

One of his arguments in support of his dualistic view may be formulated in the following way:

1.             I have a clear and distinct idea of the mind as a thinking, non-extended thing.

2.             I have a clear and distinct idea of the body as an extended, non-thinking thing.

3.             Therefore, the mind is really distinct from the body and can exist without it.

Descartes’ above argument is based on his doctrine of clear and distinct ideas. In his work ‘Principles of Philosophy’ Descartes states that a sharp intellectual focus is like a sharply focused visual perception of something, and an idea is clear when it is in sharp intellectual focus. But an idea is distinct when, in addition to be clear, all other ideas not belonging to it are completely excluded from it.

It is clear from the above argument that Descartes clearly and distinctly perceives the mind as possibly existing all by itself, and the body as possibly existing all by itself. There is no doubt that non-thinking bodies like stones, woods exist without minds. This supports his second premise i.e. ‘body as possibly existing all by itself’. But there is no settled agreement among philosophers in respect of his first premise i.e. mind as possibly existing by itself. Many philosophers doubt that minds can exist without bodies. In Descartes’ view the guarantee for the truth of whatever is clearly and distinctly understood is based on the thesis that God exists and he cannot be a deceiver. Descartes claims that clear and distinct ideas are true because if God put a false clear and distinct idea in him, then God would be the source of error and world be a deceiver. In Descartes’ view, he has already established God’s inability to deceive. So, God cannot be deceiver and hence, all clear and distinct ideas must be true.

Descartes has also given another argument in support of his dualistic view. In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes does not support his dualistic view on the basis of clear and distinct understanding of minds and bodies but instead makes his point based on particular property of each. Descartes argues that the mind is indivisible by its very nature and the body is divisible by its very nature. The property of mind is that it is a thinking thing and it is indivisible while the property of a body is that it is an extended thing and it is divisible. For example, we can break a body into several parts. But we cannot divide a mind into two minds because this division of mind would result in two selves, which is absurd. So, the nature of mind and body is completely different. The conclusion is that they are two really distinct substances.

There are also some other arguments that apparently favor the dualist thesis that minds are distinct from bodies. There is a metaphysical argument which favor substance dualism. This argument may be formulated as under:

·        Thoughts and consciousness exist.

·        Hence, there must be objects, or substances, to which thoughts and consciousness occur- that is things- that think and are conscious.

·        Thoughts and consciousness cannot occur to material things, they cannot be states of material objects, like the brain.

·        Hence, thoughts and consciousness must occur to immaterial things, like Cartesian mental substances.

·        Hence, mental substances exist and they are the things that think and are conscious, and bear other mental properties.

In the third premise it is clearly mentioned that material things, like the human brain, are unfit to serve as bears of thoughts and consciousness. For example, numbers like three or four are not the sort of thing that can have colors like blue or occupy a location in space. So, in the same way, there is an essential incongruity between mental states, like thoughts and consciousness on one hand and material things on the other, so that the former cannot inhere in, occur to the latter, just as weight and color cannot inhere in numbers. If our thoughts and consciousness cannot occur to anything material, including our brains, then they must occur to immaterial things, or Cartesians minds.

Leibniz has given an argument to show that thoughts or other mental states cannot occur to material things. Giving an example of a mill, Leibniz states that a mechanical system in which the parts causally interact with another (pieces pushing one against the other), it is not possible to see anything in this picture that would account for the presence of thought or consciousness.

Thus, even if a more complex biological system like human brain replaces Leibnitz’s mill, we find that there is an assemblage of microscopic material things, molecules and atoms and particles interacting with one another according with laws of chemistry and physics. Nowhere in this picture, do we see a thought or perception or consciousness.

These questions are helpful in clarifying dualistic views but it is not easy to understand how thoughts and consciousness can arise in an immaterial substance such as mind with no constituent parts.

Descartes’ Mind-body Interaction

According to Descartes, minds and bodies causally influence each other. In voluntary action, the minds volition causes our limbs to move; in perception, physical stimuli impinging on sensory receptors cause perceptual experiences in the mind. Our minds, in virtue of having certain desires beliefs and intentions, are able to cause our bodies to move in appropriate ways. In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes says about how mental causation works. He writes:

“The mind is not immediately affected by all parts of the body, but only by the brain, or perhaps just by one small part of the brain. Every time this part of the brain is in a given state, it presents the same signals to the mind, even though the other parts of the body may be in a different condition at that time. For example, when the nerves in the foot are set in motion in a violent and unusual manner, this motion, by way of the spinal cord, reaches the inner parts of the brain, and these gives the mind its signal for having a certain sensation, namely the sensation of pain as occurring in the foot. This stimulates the mind to do its best to get rid of the cause of the pain, which it takes to be harmful to the foot.”¹

In the Passions of the Soul, Descartes identifies the pineal gland as the seat of the soul, the locus of direct mind-body interaction. This gland, Descartes maintains, can be moved directly by the soul, thereby moving the animal spirit (bodily fluids in the nerves), which then transmit causal influence on appropriate parts of the body.

In the case of physical-to-mental causation, this process is reversed. Disturbances in the animal spirits surrounding the pineal gland make the gland move, which in turn causes the mind to experience appropriate sensations and perceptions. For Descartes, then, each of us as an embodied human person is a ‘Union’ or ‘intermingling’ of a mind and a body in direct causal interaction.

Critical Estimate of Descartes’ Dualism

Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia challenged the above view of Descartes and asked him to explain how the mind of human being, being only a thinking substance, can determine the bodily spirits in producing bodily actions. According to her, all determination of movement is produced by the pushing of the thing being moved, by the manner in which it is pushed by that which moves it. And for this contact is a necessary factor. Bodies can be moved only by contact. So, her question is that ‘how could a non-extended mind, which is not even in space come into contact with an extended material thing, even the finest and lightest particles in animal spirits, thereby, causing it to move? This is a perfectly reasonable question. We know that to move a physical object or cause any change in any object, there must be a flow of energy from the cause to the physical object. But how could there be an energy flow from an immaterial mind to a material thing. If an object is going to impart momentum to another, it must have mass and velocity. A non-extend mind outside physical space has neither mass or velocity. Descartes’ answer to the above objection is that the idea of mind-body union is a ‘primitive’ notion – a fundamental notion that is intelligible in its own right and cannot be explained in terms of the more basic notions – and that the idea of mind-body causation depends on that of mind body union.

Anthony Kenny has also criticized the Cartesian interaction. In his book ‘Descartes’, Kenny writes that Cartesian minds and physical objects are radically “diverse categories” and this fact undermines the possibility of causal interaction between the two.

Jaegwon Kim has formulated a ‘real argument’ against Cartesian dualism. This ‘real argument’ relates to pairing problem. Kim’s argument shows that immaterial minds cannot causally interact with material things situated in space. He has given an example of physical causation. A Gun, call it A, is fired, and this causes the death of a person X. Another Gun B, is fired at the same time, and this results in the death of another person Y. What makes it the case that firing of A caused X’s death and firing of B caused Y’s death, and not the other ways around? That is why did A’s firing not cause Y’s death and B’s firing not cause X’s death? Kim’s point of view is that there must be a relation R that grounds and explains the cause-effect pairing, a relation that holds between A’s firing and X’s death and also between B’s firing and Y’s death. According to Kim, spatial relations and more broadly, spatiotemporal relations – are the only way of generating pairing relations. It may be said here that Gun A was near to person X and directed towards X whereas Gun B was far away to exert any influence on X. It was because of this relation that Gun A caused the death of X.

As regards the possibility of immaterial souls, outside physical space, causally interacting with material objects in space, Kim’s view is that souls, as immaterial substances, are outside physical space and so cannot bear spatial relations to anything. It is not possible to invoke spatial relations to ground the pairing. The soul cannot be any ‘nearer’ to, or ‘more properly oriented’ toward, one physical object than another. Thus, Kim’s argument relating to pairing problem makes the idea of interaction between immaterial substance like mind and material objects like body, a dubious proposition.

Descartes called the pineal gland the “seat of the soul” presumably because it is the pineal gland where mind-body causal interaction was supposed to take place. But in my view, there is no evidence that there is any single place in the brain – a dimensionless point where mind-body interaction could take place. We know that various mental states and activities are distributed over the entire brain and nervous system, and it does not make scientific sense to think as Descartes did in regard to pineal gland, that there is a single identifiable organ responsible for all mind-body causal interactions.

Many contemporary philosophers are of the view that the concept of mind as immaterial substance is fraught with too many difficulties. Gilbert Ryle in his book ‘The Concept of Mind’ has challenged the traditional distinction between mind and body as formulated by Rene Descartes. Ryle is not in favor of dualism. In his view the fact of consciousness can be linked to the brain. He stresses that Descartes has made a ‘category mistake’. In his view, Descartes represents the fact of mental life as if they belong to one logical category, where in the actual sense they belong to another. He misrepresents the substance responsible for conscious activities.

It appears to me that the root of the problem is the issue of consciousness. Diametrically opposite views have been expressed by the philosophers on the issue of consciousness. J. Nagal writes:

“When the problem of consciousness is solved, the mind-body problem will be solved.”² Reubel Abel also stresses that the “mind-body problem exists because the state of consciousness interacts with the state of corporeal body.”³

Daniel C. Dennett, well-known for his work on consciousness, declares:

“I want to make it just as uncomfortable for anyone to talk of qualia or ‘raw feels’ or ‘phenomenal properties’ or ‘qualitative and intrinsic properties’ or the ‘qualitative character’ of experience with the presumption that they, and everyone else, knows what they are talking about. Far better, tactically, to declare that there simply are no qualia at all.”⁴

Dennett does not deny the existence of all conscious states, but only those with intrinsic qualitative properties or ‘qualia’ like the painfulness of pains and the green of a visual percept. Another philosopher of mind, Georges Ray, has rejected all forms of consciousness, not just qualitative consciousness. The idea seems to be that consciousness has no role to play in a scientific account of human mentality and that in consequence it is wholly dispensable; its existence has no purpose to serve.

Some philosophers and scientists have taken a positive and optimistic stance about the possibility of a scientific account of consciousness. Francis Crick, a Nobel prize winning molecular geneticist, has remarked that “it is hopeless to try to solve the problem of consciousness by general philosophical arguments”.⁵ In his view new experiments that might throw light on these problems are needed.

From the above discussions and views of the eminent philosophers and scientists, it is clear that the mind-body problem ultimately comes down to understanding how our conscious life is related to the biological physical processes going on in our brain. There is no doubt that the conscious state depends on, or arise from physicochemical processes in brain. But how did the electro-chemical processes in the grey matter of the brain give rise to our awareness of colors, shapes, smells and other sensory qualities delivering to us a rich kaleidoscopic picture of the world around us? For an interactionist dualist like Descartes the principle mind body problem is the problem of accounting for causal interaction between an immaterial substance and a material one. Physicalists affirm a monism of substance so they are not required to explain the possibility of causal interaction between diverse substances. The nature of their problem is different. Since the physical domain is causally closed, the question arises how can mental properties exert causal influence in the physical world? How can mental event be the cause of physical event? The second problem of the physicalist relates to consciousness. They must explain how can there be such a thing as consciousness in a physical world?

In Jaegwon Kim’s view physicalists, who believe that all mental properties can be reduced to physical ones, face two challenges in respect to the problem of consciousness. The first is the task of closing the explanatory gap between phenomenal consciousness and the physical world. The second challenge is what Kim calls the predictive gap between consciousness and the physical world. Explaining Explanatory gap, Kim states that every mental state has an underlying ‘supervenience base’ in neural states. We may consider pain as an example. According to mind-body supervenience, whenever one is in pain, there is a neural state that is the supervenience base of one’s pain. We may call this neural state N. Thus, whenever N occurs, one experiences pain. But why is it that pain, not itch or tickle, occurs when neural state N occurs? Why does the pain not arise from a different neural state? Here we are asking an explanation of why the pain-N supervenience relation holds. The problem of explanatory gap is that of providing such an explanation. Pain, apparently resists a functional characterization. Pain is a phenomenally conscious event and lies outside the scope of brain science.

But Kim is of the view that to achieve a solution to the above problem and to close the explanatory gap, we must be able to reduce consciousness to neural states, or reductively explain consciousness in terms of neural process.

The second challenge is centered upon what Kim calls the predictive gap, between consciousness and the physical world. Kim writes:

“As the emergentists claimed, it seems possible for us to know all about the physiology of a creature, say Thomas Nagel’s famously inscrutable bats, but have no idea of the qualitative character of its inner experience.”⁶

According to Kim, if the reductive physicalism is true then complete knowledge of physical properties of a creature should suffice for knowledge of mental properties of that creature. Given the fundamental features of a bat, we ought to be able to conclude the nature of any mental features that fly bat might have. Yet this is not the case, instead any prediction that we make about the conscious states of animals are based largely upon observed co-relation between physical sates and conscious ones; in addition to the physical evidence, we may rely upon observed phenomenal evidence as well. So, an adequate reductive physicalist account of the mind, then should be able to close this gap.

In the book, ‘Physicalism or Something Near Enough’, Jaewon Kim has presented an account of the mind according to which most but not all mental properties can be reduced to physical ones via functional definition.

According to Kim, if mental properties can be given functional definitions in terms of the physical domain, then mental causation can be reductively explained. Kim gives an example of a mental property ‘being amused’. Suppose we want to know how it is that our being amused is causally responsible for my laughing. If we define being amused as having some physical property or other that is apt to trigger smiles or laughter then we can construct an explanation in terms of this definition; we need only find the realizers of this causal role and explain how it is that they play the role that they do. In doing so, we will have explained how it is that ‘being amused’ causes laugher. In short, functional definitions allow us to explain the causal relevance of a mental property by appealing to the causal activity of the physical realizers of the functionally reduced mental property.

Finally, functional definitions also allow the physicalist to respond to the predictive problem of consciousness. Functional definitions allow for predictions of unobserved mental states. If pain just means being in a state apt to be caused by tissue damage and apt for causing winces and grows, then we can reasonably conclude that a bat, or a dog, who has experienced tissue damage will also be in pain. If the animal then proceeds to winces and groans, we will have further confirmation of this fact. Given full knowledge of physical states of a creature coupled with functional definitions of all known mental states, we can deduce the mental states of that creature.

If all our mental concepts or properties, could be functionally defined, then the physicalist who invoked such reductions could consider both the problem of mental causation and the problem of consciousness a thing of the past. Unfortunately, as Kim concedes, not all mental concepts can be functionalized. In particular, qualitative mental states, qualia, cannot be given functional definitions. Kim concludes: “Physicalism is not the whole truth, but it is truth near enough and the near enough should be good enough.”⁷

Conclusion

The above discussions conclude my survey of the mind-body problem. We have seen that Descartes is of the view that mind and body are really distinct. The most important part of the component of Descartes’ dualism is the thesis that mind and bodies causally influence each other. Descartes argues that the idea of mind-body union is a ‘primitive’ notion and the idea of mind-body causation depends of that of mind body union.

In favor of philosophers who view that brain is the source of consciousness it may be said that if there is brain damage, consciousness will cease or mental activities will stop. But this is not a conclusive ground to oppose the claim that mind exists. In fact, there is no any empirical proof to substantiate the view that act of consciousness is the activity of the brain. A close examination of brain does not show any sign of conscious events. For example, when we feel pain, a look at the brain does not empirically show us pain. I have also examined ‘functional reduction’ as proposed by Jaegwon Kim. But even Kim concedes that all mental concepts cannot be functionalized. In particular, the qualitative mental states, or qualia, cannot be given functional definition. It is my conclusion that science will in good time unravel all the mystery of consciousness. Patricia S. Churchland is of the view that the scientific approach is in principle capable of explaining consciousness in neural terms as she indicated, it is an empirical question whether this will actually be accomplished. It is my conclusion that effort should be made by scientists to re-investigate the problem of consciousness anew. The problem which we find in Descartes’ philosophy of mind-body interaction has not been fully resolved by the materialist interpretation of personhood.

Reference:

1.    Descartes, Rene: The Philosophical writings of Descartes, Vol.-II, Cottingham Stoothoff and Murdoch Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985,  Page-59-60.

2.      Nagel, J.: ‘What is Like to be a Bat’, In Mortal Questions, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979, Page-165-166.

3.      Abel, Reubel: Man is the Measure, New York, Free Press, 1976, Page-203.

4.      Dennett Daniel, C.: ‘Quining Qualia’, In Jaegwon Kim’s Book – Philosophy of Mind, West View Press, Page-307

5.      Crick, Francis: The Astonishing Hypothesis, New York, Seribner, 1995, Page-19.

6.      Kim, Jaegwon: ‘Physicalism, or Something Near Enough’, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2005, Page-94

7.      Kim, Jaegwon: ‘Physicalism, or Something Near Enough’, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2005, Page-94

Setu, May 2018

Contemporary Concerns: Pushpa Rani Prasad

Descartes : As the father of Modern Western Philosophy and his ‘Dream Argument related with Modern Literature’

Dr. Pushpa Rani Prasad

Abstract

In Meditation I Descartes offers an argument to show that he cannot know that he is not dreaming. This argument has occupied a central place in the history of modern philosophy: it forcefully raises the problem of external world, and, at the same time, leads to considerations that Descartes uses in his proof of dualism. It has seemed to many philosophers that some more or less simple manoeuvre is all that is needed to refute the argument. But in my view, some of the criticisms miss the mark entirely, other show that the argument needs to be reformulated in certain ways. My aim in this paper is to show that Descartes’ argument is a great deal more difficult to refute than has been commonly thought. I have pointed out Descartes’ distinction between moral and metaphysical certainty and then to show that in the light of the distinction between moral and metaphysical certainty, we can interpret the Dream Argument so that they do not commit Descartes to inconsistent claims. 

Introduction

            In the second stage of the method of doubt Descartes takes a quick inventory of the opinions that survived the first stage. Thus, while the first stage advocates a hard line against the reliability of the sense faculties in general, it soon becomes clear that the implicit arguments deployed there in fact have a more limited efficacy. So, while he admits that the senses ought not to be trusted in the extraordinary circumstances there are plenty of quite ordinary circumstances where it would be foolish to doubt their testimony. Descartes, therefore, urges a more cautious approach that recognizes that there are many occasions in which the senses simply do not offer conflicting testimony. Thus, that he is sitting by the fire, wearing his dressing gown and holding his pen and paper is testified to unequivocally by his senses and, more importantly, this picture of the situation is confirmed in a coherent way by each of his senses.  One would have to be mad to suspect the testimony of the senses in such circumstances. Descartes deploys the madness hypothesis. According to this it must be admitted that if one is mad the reliability of such opinion as ‘I am sitting in my study now’ would be called into question and it is through the introduction of this possibility that Descartes first seeks to dislodge the opinions that had survived the first stage of doubt. But soon he moves on to what is now famously referred to as dream argument. Having noted that he is not mad, or at the very least ought not to admit this possibility into his method, he immediately notes that he is in the habit of sleeping and having dreams.

Descartes’ Dream Argument           

            Having noted that, as a man, he is accustomed to dream, Descartes continues:

            “At this moment it does indeed seem to me that it is with eyes awake that I am looking at this paper; that this head which I move is not asleep, that it is deliberately and of set purpose that I extend my hand and perceive it; what happens in sleep does not appear so clear nor so distinct as does all this. But in thinking over this I remind myself that on many occasions I have in sleep been deceived by similar illusions, and in dwelling carefully on this reflection I see so manifestly that there are no certain indications by which we may clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep that I am lost in astonishment. And my astonishment is such that it is almost capable of persuading me that I now dream.” ¹

            In the above ‘Dreaming Argument’ Descartes suggests that the alleged impossibility of distinguishing waking from sleeping by certain marks provides some reason for doubting even those sense -based beliefs that concern the most obvious aspects of his current personal circumstances and surroundings. According to the most common interpretation, the dream argument is intended to show that I cannot be certain of particular sense-based judgements such as ‘I am sitting by the fire’, ‘I am standing up’, or ‘here are two human hands’. And it is supposed to reach this conclusion via the premises; I cannot know for certain that I am now awake, rather than asleep and dreaming.

            The Dream Argument has received the close scrutiny Cartesian classics deserve. Critics have raised objections, and friends of Descartes have tried to answer them.

            Descartes wants to show that some of his sensory evidenced beliefs are uncertain. He opens with:

(1)       My present experience is qualitatively indistinguishable from dreams I have had.

With the aid of other premises, he infers what is called the Dream Uncertainly Principle:

(2)       I am uncertain that I am not now dreaming.

Descartes then uses (2) and other premises to get:

(3)       I am uncertain of particular propositions evidenced by my senses.

G.M. Moore’s objection to the Dream Argument is still widely accepted. Moore objects that Descartes is committed to inconsistent claims. Moore thinks the argument is in trouble even before the details are filled in:

            “There is a very serious objection to the procedure of using it (1) as a premise in favour of the derived conclusion (2). For a philosopher who does use it (1) as a premise, is, I think, in fact implying, though he does not expressly say, that he himself knows it to be true. He is implying therefore that he himself knows that dreams have occurred. And, of course, I think he would be right. All the philosophers I have ever met or heard of certainly did know that dreams have occurred: we all know that dreams have occurred. But can he consistently combine this proposition that he knows that dreams have occurred, with his conclusion that he does not know that he is not dreaming? Can anybody possibly know that dreams have occurred, if, at the time, he does not himself know that he is not dreaming? If he is dreaming, it may be that he is only dreaming that dreams have occurred; and if he does not know that he is not dreaming, can he possibly know that he is not only dreaming that dreams have occurred? Can he possibly know therefore that dreams have occurred? I do not think he can; and therefore, I think that anyone who uses this premise and also asserts the conclusion that nobody ever knows that he is not dreaming, is guilty of an inconsistency.”²

            When Descartes uses (1) in his argument, he presumably commits himself to the claim that (1) is certain; that is, to

(4)       I am certain that (1) my present experience is qualitatively indistinguishable from dreams I have had.

            Moore things that (4) is inconsistent with the Dream Uncertainty Principle (2). Just as the Dream Uncertainty Principle implies that Descartes is not certain of particular beliefs evidenced by his senses, it also implies that Descartes is not certain that he has had dreams qualitatively indistinguishable from his present experience.

            Other commentators agree with Moore. David Blumenfeld and Jean Beer Blumenfeld in their recent examination of the Dream Argument announce that “Moore is correct”³.

            The problem Descartes sets himself in the First Meditation is to find ‘certain marks’ to distinguish dreaming from waking, where this is understood to mean marks by which one may certainly tell on a given occasion whether one is, on that occasion, dreaming or waking. But Descartes comes to retract the denial at the end of the Sixth Meditation. That is, he comes to affirm that there are certain marks to distinguish waking from dreaming.

            He writes:

            “And I must reject all the doubts of these past days, as hyperbolic and ridiculous, particularly that one about sleep, which I could not distinguish from waking; for now, I notice that there is a very great distinction between them, in as much as the things of sleep are never joined together with all the other actions of life by memory, like those which occur when awake.”⁴

Margaret Dauler Wilson is of the view that there are grounds for considering a different reading of both the initial argument and the reply of the Sixth Meditation. On this reading the ‘marks’ Descartes seeks are not criteria to determine whether he is on a given occasion dreaming. This interpretation goes as follows:

1.            I believe in the past I have dreamed that I was perceiving various physical objects at close range when it was false that I was really perceiving any such objects (when my experience was thoroughly delusory.)

2.            If I see no certain marks to distinguish waking experience of physical objects from dream experience when, I believe, I was deceived, I have reason to believe my waking experience too may be deceptive.

3.            I see no such certain marks to distinguish waking experience from dreams.

4.            Therefore, I have reason to suppose that waking experience too may be deceptive (thoroughly delusory).

5.            But if I have reason to suppose my waking experience may be deceptive, I have reason to doubt the existence of physical objects.

According to Wilson:

“Here the source of doubt is not located in the problem of knowing one is awake; it is rather expressed in the claim that I cannot say why I should unquestionably regard waking experience of physical objects as real or veridical, when there are no marks to distinguish it from the illusions of dreams.”⁵

On this reading, the point of the observations about connectability in Meditation VI is that there are after all marks present in waking experience that explain why we should rationally regard it as different from the illusions of dreams – i.e. as having some claims to veridicality. The fact that one has falsely dreamed he perceives physical objects no longer provides a ground for doubt of one’s present waking belief that one is perceiving physical objects. For one notices that his waking experience has a characteristic one finds to be lacking in the dream experience he dismisses as unreal. Descartes’ statements of the Dreaming Argument in the ‘Discourse on Method’ and in the ‘Principles of Philosophy’ also indicate that the question to be raised is not whether he is awake but rather whether the objects experienced when awake are real.

            I have discussed Wilson’s alternative reading of Descartes’ dream argument. Now I shall examine Peter J. Markie’s views. In his paper Dream and Deceivers in Mediation I Markie has tried to eliminate the ambiguity in Descartes’ Dream argument. We have seen that Moore is of the view that Descartes is committed to inconsistent claims. Markie is of the view that the terms ‘uncertain’ and ‘certain’ are ambiguous in the four claims they cite; once we eliminate the ambiguity, Descartes’ position is clearly consistent.  Markie is of the view that once we appreciate Descartes’ distinction between moral and metaphysical certainty, we can show that Descartes’ position is clearly consistent.

            First, I find it necessary to clarify the definitions of moral and metaphysical certainties.

In Discourse on Method Descartes says that it is more certain that he has a soul and that God exists than he is that there are stars and an earth. He has metaphysical certainty, or complete assurance, about God and his soul; he has only moral certainty about the stars and the earth. Moral certainty is a lower grade of epistemic appraisal than metaphysical certainty, but it still has some punch to it; Descartes says that it is extravagant for him to doubt moral certainties.

The distinction between metaphysical and moral certainty also comes into play in the First Meditation. After he presents the Dream and Deceiver Arguments, Descartes says that beliefs he has considered are:

“Opinions in some measure doubtful, as I have just shown, and at the same time highly probable, so that there is much more reason to believe in them than to deny them”.⁶

Descartes might have put his point in slightly different terms. The beliefs he has considered are not metaphysical certainties (they lack complete assurance), but they are moral certainties.

In my view the supposedly inconsistent claims citied by Moore are ambiguous. The term ‘certain’ in each may refer to moral or to metaphysical certainty; ‘uncertain’ to moral or to metaphysical uncertainty. We need only explore the concepts of moral and metaphysical certainty to see that Descartes’ position is consistent.

Let us concentrate on moral certainty first. Descartes thinks our moral certainties have three important characteristics.

“It is ‘extravagant for us to doubt them”.⁷

“We have ‘more reason to believe in them than to deny them.”⁸

“And they are ‘highly probable, so that there is much more reason to believe in them than to deny them.”⁹

            What about metaphysical certainty? According to Descartes, metaphysical certainty is a higher grade of epistemic appraisal than moral certainty; metaphysical certainty is ‘complete assurance’. His point is again fairly clear. When a proposition is a metaphysical certainty for us, believing it is more reasonable for us from the standard perspective than doubting it or denying it; indeed, believing it is as reasonable as belief ever can be from that perspective.

Descartes thinks his metaphysical certainties are just those moral certainties he has no reason to doubt.

This is all the information we need to give an adequate Cartesian response to Moore. It is time to reconsider Descartes’ presumably inconsistent commitments which Moore cites as discussed above. Premises (2) as above states that -

            “I am uncertain that I am not now dreaming.”

            and premise (4) states that -

            “I am certain that (1) my present experience is qualitatively   indistinguishable from dreams I have had.”

We can quickly clear away part of the ambiguity involved. (2) is a premise of the Dream Argument. It says that reasons for doubt have not been ruled out. Since reasons of doubt need only be metaphysical possibilities, the term ‘uncertain’ in (2) refers to metaphysical uncertainty. We may restate them as:

            (2a) It is a metaphysical possibility for me that I am now dreaming.

            What about (4)? We have two choices with regard to (4):

            (4a) I am metaphysically certain that (1) my present experience is qualitatively indistinguishable from dreams I have had.

            (4b) I am morally certain that (1) my present experience is                qualitatively indistinguishable from dreams I have had.

            Descartes is in trouble if he is claiming metaphysical certainty, viz. (4a). According to (2a), Descartes has not ruled out the hypothesis that his present experience, including his recollection of having had dreams like his present experience, is all part of a dream. If Descartes has not ruled out this hypothesis, his belief that he has had dreams like his present experience is not maximally reasonable from the standard perspective. He lacks the metaphysical certainty claimed in (4a).

            The contradictions Moore is after do not arise if Descartes is claiming only moral certainty, viz. (4b). Descartes can be morally certain of a proposition even though he has a reason to doubt it. The metaphysical possibility that he is dreaming does not imply that he is morally uncertain that he has had dreams similar to his present experience.

            Moore does not try to show that Descartes is committed to the claims to metaphysical certainty, (4a), rather than those to moral certainty, (4b). We may suggest two arguments on his behalf.

            The first argument appeals to the text. When Descartes begins the Meditations, he exchanges the standard epistemic imperative, believe all and only what is true, for the Cartesian imperative, believe only what is true and metaphysically certain. Since Descartes accepts that Cartesian imperative and goes on to give the Dream Argument, he is committed to the claim that the premises of his arguments are metaphysically certain and true. He is, therefore, committed to (4a).

            This otherwise persuasive argument has one flaw. Descartes does not simply replace the standard epistemic imperative the one to believe only what is true and metaphysically certain. His new Cartesian imperative is to include in his scientific theory all and only what is metaphysically certain and true. Descartes does not give up the standard imperative, he just restricts its range of application to areas other than science. His investigation in the Meditations is governed by two imperatives: to accept, under the heading of ‘non-science’, all and only what is true; to include under the heading of ‘science’ all and only what is metaphysically certain and true. Since the Dream Argument is not part of his scientific theory, his acceptance of its premises and conclusions is governed by the standard epistemic imperative. He is committed to the claim that its premises and conclusions are true and reasonable for him to adopt from the standard perspective (morally certain). Yet, none of this amounts to a commitment to (4a) with their claims to metaphysical certainty.

            It appears to me that the text supports the view that Descartes restricts his new imperative to his scientific theory. He never says he adopts the new imperative without restriction. While he does not directly say that he limits the new imperative to the sciences, several passages indirectly support this view. When he presents the new imperative in Meditation I, he prefaces his statement of it with a biographical account that shows the sciences are his concern: 

            “It is now some years since I detected how many were the false beliefs that I had from my earliest youth admitted as true, and how doubtful was everything I had since constructed on this basis; and from that time I was convinced that I must once for all seriously undertake to rid myself of all the opinions which I had formerly accepted, and commence to build a new from the foundations, if I wanted to establish any firm and permanent structure in the sciences.”¹⁰

There is also textual support for the view that Descartes does not include the Dream Argument in his scientific theory. Descartes’s scientific theory includes some philosophical principles that provide the basis for mathematics and the physical sciences:

“But having noticed that the knowledge of these difficulties [in mathematics and other sciences] must be dependent on principles derived from Philosophy in which I yet found nothing to be certain, I thought that it was requisite above all to try to establish certainty in it.”¹¹

Descartes presents these metaphysically certain philosophical principles in the Meditations and the Principles, and he does not list the premises and conclusions of the Dream Argument among them. In the Meditations, he presents the Dream Argument in Meditation I but does not claim to find a metaphysically certain proposition until he considers his existence in Meditation II. In the Principles, two sections after he gives the Dream Argument, he writes that:

“[T]his conclusion ‘I think, therefore I am’ is the first and most certain of all that occurs to one who philosophises in an orderly way.”¹²

Descartes fills out his scientific theory in both works by adding claims about his own nature and God’s to the one that he thinks and, therefore, exists. He then decides that these philosophical claims provide the basis for mathematics and the physical sciences:

“And it seems to me that I now have before me a road which will lead us from the contemplation of the true God (in whom all the treasures of science and wisdom are contained) to knowledge of the other objects of the universe.”¹³

“And now that I know Him I have the means of acquiring a perfect knowledge of an infinitude of things, not only of those which relate to God Himself and other intellectual matters, but also of those which pertain to corporeal nature in so far as it is the object of pure mathematics (which have no concern with whether it exists or not).”¹⁴

Descartes never includes the Dream Argument among his scientific discoveries.

The second argument which has been suggested on behalf of Moore gives us a choice. Either decide that Descartes presents the Dream Argument in an attempt to derive metaphysically certain conclusions from metaphysically certain premises or decide that those arguments have no important epistemic role in the First Meditation. Since the second choice is unacceptable, we are stuck with the first.

The problem with this argument is that the Dream Argument has an important epistemic influence on Descartes consistent with their having only morally certain premises and conclusions. Since, we may assume, their premises are moral certainties, the arguments make Descartes morally certain that propositions he has previously accepted in the natural sciences and mathematics are metaphysically uncertain. The attainment of this epistemic state is very important to him. Once it is reasonable for him to believe, from the standard perspective, that those previously accepted propositions are metaphysically uncertain, it is also reasonable for him to believe, from that perspective, that those propositions do not meet the requirement set by the Cartesian imperative for inclusion in his scientific theory. This makes it reasonable for him to exclude those previously accepted propositions from his scientific theory, which is just what he does at the end of the First Meditation.

Descartes comes very close to describing this epistemic function of his arguments:

“[A]t the end I feel constrained to confess that there is nothing in all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty [in the sciences].”¹⁵

I think Descartes has in mind that his moral certainty that his past beliefs are metaphysically uncertain (‘I feel constrained to confess that there is nothing in all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt’) plus his decision to include in his scientific theory only what is metaphysically certain (‘if I desire to arrive at any certainty in the sciences’) makes it reasonable for him to exclude his past beliefs from his scientific theory (‘I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false’). He later includes some of these past beliefs in his scientific theory, but he only does so once he is able to derive them from his presumably metaphysically certain philosophical claims about his own nature and God’s.

On the basis of above discussions, I have come to the conclusion that once we appreciate Descartes’ distinction between moral and metaphysical certainty, we can interpret the Dream Argument so that they do not commit Descartes to inconsistent claims. We can do this in a way that provides those argument with an important function in Descartes’ strategy of general doubt.

Markie has rightly said that:

“They give him the morally certain information that some of his past beliefs are metaphysically uncertain. This information makes his exclusion of those beliefs from his scientific theory under his new Cartesian imperative reasonable.”¹⁶

REFERENCE

1	Haldane, Elizabeth.S and G.R.T Ross; The Philosophical Works of Descartes,  Cambridge University Press, 1967, p.146
2	Moore, George Edward; ‘Certainty’ In Philosophical Papers p. 248-249  Quoted in Rene Descartes : Critical Assessments, Ed. by J.D. Moyal,  Vol II, Routledge, London, p. 111
3	Blumenfeld, David and Jean Beer Blumenfeld; Can I know that I am not Dreaming. In – Descartes : Critical and Interpretive Essays Ed – Michael Hooker, London, p. 240
4	Haldane, Elizabeth.S and G.R.T Ross; The Philosophical Works of Descartes,  Cambridge University Press, 1967; Vol I, p.198-99
5	Wilson, Margaret Dauler; Descartes, Routledge & Kegan Paul London, 1978, p.23
6	Haldane, Elizabeth.S and G.R.T Ross; The Philosophical Works of Descartes,  Cambridge University Press, 1967; Vol I, p.148
7	Ibid; Vol I, p.104
8	Ibid; Vol I, p.148
9	Ibid; Vol I, p.148
10	Ibid; Vol I, p.144
11	Ibid; Vol I, p.94
12	Ibid; Vol I, p.221
13	Ibid; Vol I, p.172
14	Ibid; Vol I, p.185
15	Ibid; Vol I, p.148
16	Markie, Peter J.; Dreams and Deceiver in Meditation I. In Rene Descartes, Critical Assessments, Vol II, Routledge, London, p.126

About the Writer:Dr. Pushpa Rani Prasad, a Commissioned Principal, working at S.P. Mahila College, Dumka, Jharkhand (India) writes in both English and Hindi. She is a pioneer of modern vision and her voice for modern Indian women is miraculous and outstanding.

Setu, April 2018